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I.

When Scarcity is Not Moderate
In May of 1846, 82 American pioneers left Independence, Missouri, bound for

California. Normally, those traveling the California Trail would leave mid-April to save
time to cross the western mountain passes before winter. When the group arrived in
Wyoming, sensing the urgency of a late start, they elected to take an untested shortcut
through the Wasatch Mountains. This shortcut ultimately added a month to their
expedition, and by early November, they found themselves stranded beneath a blizzard in
the mountains of the Sierra Nevada. With the mountain passes now rendered
impenetrable, the pioneers retreated and set up camp at the nearby Truckee Lake to wait
out the winter. 1
Quickly, the food and supplies they had left dwindled, and one by one, the settlers
began to perish from starvation. As their numbers dropped, the remaining survivors
confronted the desperate reality of the situation: no food, no way out, and no end in sight.
Without any resources to maintain themselves, the group engaged in one of the most
grotesque acts a person can do; they boiled the frozen bodies of their fallen comrades and
consumed their flesh. 2
This is not a story about the Donner Party, but a story about scarcity. More
specifically, how does our conception of “what we should do” change when we lack the
means to sustain our normal obligations? When the surviving members were eventually

1

Evan Andrews, “10 Things You Should Know About the Donner Party,” History.com
(A&E Television Networks, April 14, 2016), https://www.history.com/news/10-thingsyou-should-know-about-the-donner-party.
2

Andrews, “10 Things You Should Know About the Donner Party.”
4

rescued in April of 1847, they readily admitted to cannibalism. They were not convicted
or charged with any criminal acts.
Just as people can find themselves with new standards of justice in dire
circumstances, many governments find themselves making decisions in situations of
extreme scarcity. There is no shortage of literature providing guidance for just policy
choices in the developed world. Famously, John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, lays out
the circumstances in which justice can exist. Rawls understands these circumstances as
“the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary.” 3
Among them, Rawls posits the necessity of “moderate scarcity,” where not only are
resources not so overabundant that “cooperation become[s] superfluous,” but conditions
not “so harsh that fruitful ventures . . . break down.” 4
But what happens when scarcity is not moderate? Rawls thrives when
distinguishing what is just when circumstances are ideal and these circumstances are
presupposed. However, what does this mean for the government of Burundi, with a GDP
per capita of just $700? 5 These conditions, by any measure, would qualify as harsh.
Reality confronts us with an abundance of such harsh conditions. Burundi cannot afford
to create an extensive system of “equal basic liberties.” 6 Their economic capabilities

3

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1999), 109.
4

Rawls, 110.

5

“COUNTRY COMPARISON: GDP - PER CAPITA (PPP),” The World Factbook
(Central Intelligence Agency), accessed June 13, 2020,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.
6

Rawls, 266.
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restrict their capacity to create the justice prescribed by the standards of moderate
scarcity. 7 This paper carves out a space not in ideal theory, but nonideal theory focused
on the absence of moderate scarcity.
This is a descriptive argument, focused within the sphere of how governments
actually function. To that end, this paper is an account of how rights work under extreme
restrictions, what makes these rights robust and valuable in practice, and how a nation
can achieve a larger bundle of rights.
The last pioneer to be rescued from the Sierra Nevada was a Prussian man, Lewis
Keseberg. When he was finally rescued in April of 1847, rumors circulated from other
survivors that Keseberg had not only cannibalized the bodies of other travelers but had
murdered them for food. 8 While Keseberg was never formally charged due to the lack of
evidence, it was clear that had there been evidence, he would have faced certain
punishment.
In conditions of moderate scarcity, neither cannibalism nor murder is remotely
acceptable. Nevertheless, when travelers found themselves trapped in a snowstorm with
no way out, one became acceptable, and the other did not. Why? What determines, when
trapped in the snowstorm, which obligations remain, and which fall by the wayside?
In his book Dark Ghettos, Thomas Shelby, similarly, argues extreme scarcity
alters obligations, in this case: in the ghettos. Shelby argues for different standards for

7

“World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Burundi,” Human Rights Watch, January 14,
2020, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/burundi.
8

Andrews, “10 Things You Should Know About the Donner Party.”
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criminal acts that result from “inequities in the prevailing opportunity structure,” because
“one is not necessarily being unreasonable when one chooses unlawful means to attain
the expected standard of living.” 9 But just as Lewis Keseberg was held to a certain
standard, regardless, Shelby maintains that this scarcity “does not mean that the ghetto
poor have no moral duties to one another or to others.” 10 Even for those living in ghettos,
there are still duties, such as avoiding “unnecessary suffering” and “mutual respect.” 11
Shelby focuses on how nonideal theory might shed light on those living in harsh
conditions in circumstances of injustice. Yet, people can find themselves in situations of
extreme scarcity, not as a result of unjust circumstances created by human beings, but by
the randomness and harshness of the world. The Donner Party did not find themselves
trapped in a snowstorm with dwindling supplies because any person or government
wronged them. No, they were thrust into a terrible situation because of weather patterns
they could not predict. But just the same, their obligations changed—cannibalism became
acceptable—in light of their options. Routinely, we observe an individual person’s
obligations broaden and narrow in conjunction with the resources at their disposal,
regardless of the cause. Should we not expect governments’ obligations to do the same?
So, to the question at hand: what obligations do governments have when they find
themselves, metaphorically speaking, trapped in a snowstorm? The world is populated

9

Tommie Shelby, “Part III: Rejecting the Claims of Law — Crime,” in Dark Ghettos:
Injustice, Dissent, and Reform (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2016), https://books.apple.com/us/book/dark-ghettos/id1176267048.
10

Shelby, “Part III: Rejecting the Claims of Law — Crime,”

11

Ibid.
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with countries living with an extreme scarcity of resources. The government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo generated only $4.63 billion in revenue in 2017, less
than 5% of Alphabet’s revenue the same year. 12 What if a government must choose
between providing a police force and providing clean water; what is the right thing to do
when either outcome would represent an injustice in the developed world? Similarly, if
“ought implies can,” they cannot be criticized for failing to provide both water and police
if they cannot afford both. Governments under the right circumstances must be able to
make terrible choices, justly.
When discussing an individual’s obligations, we often speak in the language of
“what they owe to other individuals.” In contrast, discussions concerning governments
should first revolve around what they owe to their citizens. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls
answers this question by providing a framework for determining a just bundle of rights
and distributions. If Rawls requires moderate scarcity as a precondition for justice, then,
at least in part, the most just end for a government in extreme scarcity must be to take its
citizens to moderate scarcity so that they too may experience full justice; they must guide
their country out of the snowstorm.

12

John Callaham, “Alphabet Records $110 Billion in Revenue for 2017, Google's Annual
Hardware Sales Doubled,” Android Authority, February 1, 2018,
https://www.androidauthority.com/alphabet-q4-2017-earnings-834774/; “The World
Factbook: Congo, Democratic Republic of The,” The World Factbook (Central
Intelligence Agency), accessed June 13, 2020,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html.
8

This paper does not answer the question of how they can do this. Instead, it
provides the language for discussions centering around the choices developing nations
must make concerning human rights.
In Chapter Two, Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein’s book, The Cost of
Rights, serves as a springboard. Holmes and Sunstein argue that, from a descriptive
perspective, negative rights—traditionally understood—do not exist; they are a myth.
Dispelling with the idea of negative rights will reveal an unfortunate, yet crucial, truth.
All rights are positive rights. Hence, all rights have costs.
Chapter Three uses this truth to create a new framework for understanding rights
within the policymaking process: not as endowed, but as a type of good that governments
must “purchase” for their citizens. Like most goods, rights can exist to varying degrees of
quality. Governments are responsible for creating and paying for the institutions
necessary to maintain and protect different rights.
This new framework will move us into Chapter Four, where we will ground
“rights as goods” within the reality of extreme scarcity. Situated within this context, we
will confront the reality that all nations will not be able to purchase all rights and will
instead have to make choices between them. Instead of asking, “what rights do we have?”
nations must ask, “what rights are worth paying for?” Additionally, can a nation buy
“cheaper,” less robust, versions of a right if that is all they can afford?
In Chapter Five, we will grapple with whether certain rights are more valuable,
not intrinsically, but specifically to a developing nation. This chapter invokes Amartya
Sen’s conception of instrumental freedoms from Development as Freedom to highlight
how some rights can derive value through how they connect and facilitate the creation of
9

other rights. In the context of a government attempting to maximize extremely scarce
resources, rights that facilitate economic development have more value. Economic
development is not an end within itself; instead, economic development is a means for
governments to purchase larger, higher-quality, bundles of rights for their citizens.
Consequently, conversations concerning which rights should be prioritized for
developing nations should include the language of which rights will allow for the most
economic development as a means for growing a nation’s “purchasing power” for other
rights. In other words, even if, according to a moral theory, a specific right has less
intrinsic value, a right can be more valuable for a developing nation if it grows that
nation’s ability to acquire other rights.
In this way, nations will exist within a continuum where their obligations will
expand in line with their resources. Importantly, this continuum falls below whatever
threshold where an ideal theory kicks in, such as Rawls’ first principles at the threshold
of moderate scarcity. In truth, the threshold does not matter. The theory in this paper
represents a pathway forward towards more resources and more rights. At what point on
this pathway and which obligations of ideal theory shall apply is a different question for a
different paper, and not crucial towards understanding the issues addressed in this one.
As will be argued in more detail, more rights and resources are necessary for almost any
ideal theory to apply.
Finally, Chapter Six will highlight the distinct advantage that such conversations
have in creating a neutral space for discussion. Specifically, regardless of one’s held
opinions regarding the “ideal” bundle of rights—whether they lean towards

10

libertarianism, classical liberalism, or any other belief system—all can profitably
participate in discussions concerning rights using the language of economic development.
My hope for this paper, ultimately, is to provide the tools for conversations
surrounding rights for struggling nations. These conversations, inherently, involve
tackling seemingly impossible tasks: choosing some rights that many would consider
basic over others. These tools are lacking within the existing canon of ideal theory. The
privilege of nations living in moderate scarcity is that they can choose to ignore the
reality of the snowstorm. But for those nations making their way out of the storm, they
require a means for choosing among which normally unjust methods are not only just, but
necessary.

11

II.

The Myth of Negative Rights
This chapter primarily seeks to synopsize a central argument of Stephen Holmes

and Cass R. Sunstein’s book, The Cost of Rights. As foreshadowed in Chapter One, this
paper concerns, in part, whether nations may purchase rights as goods for their citizens.
To that end, understanding the relationship between costs and rights is essential.
However, this chapter is not a calculus of the specific costs of rights; instead, it is an
answer to the questions: do rights have costs? And if so, which? Spoiler alert: the answer
is “yes” and “all of them.”
Holmes and Sunstein begin by grounding their argument within a descriptive
realm as opposed to a moral realm. They write that they are “more interested in
explaining how legal systems function and less oriented towards justification.” 13
Importantly, this paper exists within a similar sphere focused on the reality of governance
and the application of justice rather than theory. 14
From this perspective, Holmes and Sunstein introduce a popular “dichotomy”
found in legal scholarship: positive versus negative rights. There are many more robust
definitions of positive and negative rights that rely more heavily on notions of private
moral obligations. These definitions have their own value. However, for the purpose of
this paper, we will assume the definitions Holmes and Sunstein provide fitted to their

13

Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on
Taxes (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2000), 16.
14

This chapter borrows heavily from an essay I wrote for a PPE Politics seminar my 3rd
year of college. This essay was written in response to reading The Cost of Rights for the
very first time. This essay, and the thoughts that composed it, laid the groundwork and
eventually served as the foundation for this project.
12

descriptive argument. Ultimately, it does not matter if these definitions are accepted,
merely that in this context, the terms “positive” and “negative” correspond to Holmes and
Sunstein’s understanding.
According to this understanding, negative rights are those that “ban and exclude
government,” while positive rights “invite and demand government.” 15 Holmes and
Sunstein intend to reject this understanding to arrive at their desired conclusion, “all
rights are positive rights.” 16 This is not to say that negative rights do not exist morally.
Perhaps, it is true there are certain rights the government should be excluded from. But
from a descriptive perspective, the question becomes: is the government excluded from
these rights in order for them to exist in practice?
To answer this question, they run through a few examples that highlight the
paradoxical nature of negative rights. For example, they offer a right that intuitively fits
neatly into the “negative” category: the right against being tortured by police officers and
prison guards. At first glance, one might assume such a right obviously requires no
government action: only that the government refrains from torture. Yet, Holmes and
Sunstein highlight that for a state to actually guarantee this right, they must pay salaried
doctors who are willing to submit evidence in court to check up on inmates. More
broadly, rights require a judiciary to protect against violations. 17 In fact, to protect
violations of any right, a judiciary is required to enforce punishment in the case of

15

Holmes and Sunstein, 40.

16

Ibid, 48.

17

Ibid, 45.
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violations. Therefore, minimally, all rights cost “whatever it costs to recruit, train, supply,
pay and monitor” the judiciary. 18
If the cost of these institutions is the minimum, Holmes and Sunstein provide
numerous examples of more “costly” rights. For example, rights that demand government
agencies to provide remedies and interpret legislation. 19 Therefore, if all rights cost—at a
minimum—the price of a judiciary, then legal rights presuppose the judiciary. 20
Furthermore, if almost all government revenue stems, in some form, from taxes, then
legal rights also presuppose taxes.
What are taxes? They are a positive act of government. They not only “invite”
government, they “demand” it. They must be legislated, collected, and enforced, all
positive acts of government. It is this quality that leads to Holmes and Sunstein’s
conclusion: if legal rights presuppose taxes, and all taxes are positive acts of government,
then all rights are positive rights. 21
Why is this conclusion so crucial for this paper? If we accept that all rights are
positive, then we accept that all rights have some cost, even if it is to varying degrees. If
this were not the case, all developing nations could conceivably have every single
negative right robust, protected, and in place. These negative rights would be free; they

18

Holmes and Sunstein, 48

19

Ibid. 48

20

In Western thought, the adversarial system is held up as the standard for the Rule of
Law. If such a system involves representation, as it does in the United States and many
other countries, this facet alone can be costly enough to even challenge the capabilities of
nations with moderate scarcity.
21

Holmes and Sunstein, 44-48.
14

would not be subject to the same limitations that extreme scarcity of resources poses on
so-called positive rights.
This is not the case. If these rights, and all rights, do indeed carry a financial price
tag, then we can better understand why a government struggling in extreme scarcity
would have to choose between rights. They cannot afford them all. If all rights have
costs, all of us, not just developing nations, find ourselves confronted with a new
articulation of a relatively old question. Instead of asking, “what rights do we have?” we
must ask ourselves, “what rights are worth paying for?”

15

III.

Rights as Goods
In the previous chapter, we established a crucial feature of legal rights. They all

have costs. In this chapter, we will springboard off of this recognition to make a
relatively small, but perhaps uncomfortable, move. We can think about legal rights as
goods to be purchased by governments on behalf of their citizens.
This mindset seems to fly in the face of everything we teach about rights. Often,
that they are inalienable and equal for all human beings. The idea that a government
could choose to—or choose not to— “purchase” a right for its citizens appears directly
counter to that understanding.
We must recognize that this conception of rights is strictly applicable in the moral
sense. They speak to our private obligations. Consequently, these beliefs about moral
rights can coexist with a reformulation of how we think of legal rights. Moral rights run
parallel to legal rights; they inform each other, but they are not each other.
If when legal rights exist, they have costs, what happens when legal rights do not
have costs? Logic would dictate that based on the previous premise—if a legal right has
no cost—it does not exist. If a government does not collect taxes, does not fund a
judiciary, does not create the necessary institutions, then there exist neither protections
nor means for repercussions if a citizen finds this right violated. Legally, the right is not
there.
Morally speaking, there is no difference between what rights you have when the
government funds a judiciary, and when there is no judiciary. If you believe that the
government has an obligation not to violate your freedom of speech in the former

16

context, then this obligation remains in the latter. However, if the government chooses to
disregard this obligation and violates this right anyways, you can seek protection from a
judiciary in the former case, but not in the latter. In this way, legal rights are distinct
from moral rights. Moral rights mandate what everyone should or should not do. Legal
rights dictate what happens if someone chooses to ignore this mandate.
This is true in the developing world, just as it is true in the developed world. In
the United States, there are plenty of rights that we have decided not to afford legal
protections. For example, many may believe they have a moral right not to lie and not be
lied to, barring a few exceptions. Yet, there is no legal consequence for telling a lie in the
US except in specific situations where you can prove damages. Protections (outside of
previously stated cases) against being lied to have zero budgetary costs for the United
States government, and therefore legally, the right does not exist, despite its moral status.
As Holmes and Sunstein write that “a legal right exists, in reality, only when and if it has
budgetary costs.” 22
Conceivably, if we imagine for a moment the First Amendment, the government
could pass a law outlawing lying. Given how often people lie, giving this law teeth would
take considerable effort. A new court would be made dedicated to lying cases, or a
special department in the police force focused on tracking down liars. These new
institutions would require additional funding. To pay for these new costs, the government
would likely need to levy a new tax.

22

Holmes and Sunstein, 19.
17

So, moral rights are not legal rights. But they can be if, through our governments,
we choose to make them so. It is this act—of choosing—that acts as the vehicle for
thinking of legal rights as goods to be purchased. A nation and its citizens are consumers
of rights. A nation’s government must decide that it desires a legal right for its citizens, as
an individual decides it desires a sweater for his or her person. However, first, both must
calculate the cost of their respective “good.” In the case of the individual, they check the
price tag in the store.
For the nation, it is a policymaking exercise. The nation must decide what
institutions are necessary to make a right exist. These costs will be dependent on the type
of citizens within the nation. For example, we can imagine a society composed of wellintentioned citizens that defer entirely to the government to set up laws and will respect
those laws regardless of what they are. In this society, there would be no violators of
laws. Consequently, there would be no need for institutions to handle these violators,
making the costs of legal rights absurdly cheap, if not bordering on free.
Would this be a case of legal rights without costs? Possibly, but unfortunately,
human history has yet to provide us with such a nation where violators of rights and laws
do not exist. This paper’s focus is grounded in real-world decisions. We can safely
assume that all legal rights there will eventually be at least one violator. Therefore, all
legal rights will, indeed, have costs.
On the other end of the spectrum, we can consider a society built on greed with no
respect for moral values. How would the costs of legal rights be different in this

18

situation? 23 If every citizen is a potential violator, then that nation would face extremely
high price tags for the purchase of legal rights. In the real world, nations will find
themselves situated between these two extremes, with the cost of legal rights existing, in
part, as a function of where they sit on this spectrum.
What if a law is enforced not by government adjudication and sanctions, but by
the social actions—via outcasting—of the citizens? In this case, there are costs, but the
government does not suffer them. From a government perspective, the legal right might
be considered costless. However, again, on the scale of a nation, it seems improbable that
a law could ever be fully enforced without government intervention. For example, we can
imagine a murderer with no interest in taking part in society content to live in the woods.
Social outcasting would not be enough to protect the right to life from such a violator.
Much like the case of the perfectly well-intentioned society, we can safely put this
situation aside while focusing on developing nations. Nevertheless, if this framework
were applied elsewhere, these considerations could be taken into account.
After determining cost, nations must consider whether this purchase is affordable.
Do they have the money to create these intuitions? If not, can they borrow it? If they do
put forth resources to protect the right, the right now exists legally. Similarly, the
individual gives the store their debit card and walks out wearing a brand-new sweater.
Obviously, there are key differences between buying a right and buying a sweater.
Most notably, the notion of transfer. Someone owns the sweater previously, and
purchasing it will result transfer costs to the initial owner in exchange for the garment. A

23

First, we might wonder how a society lacking all morality came together to enforce a
conception of moral rights, but that is neither here nor there.
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legal right is not owned previously. The United States does not buy its right to free press
from Australia. When it comes to legal rights, the act of purchasing is also an act of
creation.
If legal rights are the goods, then what is the marketplace? What legal rights are
available for purchase? In this scheme, purchasing a right is an act of making a moral
right legal. Therefore, whatever we consider as moral rights determines the possibilities
of which legal rights we would purchase.
This is where ideal theory plays a role. For example, the set of right Rawls
prescribes for a nation living in moderate scarcity would determine the available “goods,”
or potential rights, that a nation would purchase. Why? Conceivably, a government could
build institutions and fund protections for your legal right never to be given a gift. Under
this policy, if someone did give you a gift, you could sue them. Of course, no one would
ever want or need these protections. The rights we would want to purchase would be
those that we feel, morally, we are owed, and should be protected.
The other way we can think of rights as goods is with respect to quality. When an
individual goes to a clothing store, they face more than the choice of whether to buy a
sweater or not. Often, there are multiple sweaters available. Some might be cheaper but
made of poor-quality fabric, and others might be much more expensive, but higher
quality. Legal rights can share these characteristics. Let us consider the right to private
property. There is a range of protections for one’s right to private property. Imagine, at
the lowest end of the spectrum, a nation pays for one policeman and one judge for the
entire population. Technically speaking, this nation has attempted to purchase your right

20

to private property, but they have bought such a poor-quality version of it, akin to having
no right at all. This nation has purchased a sweater made of soggy paper towels.
A nation could also purchase a high-quality version of this right. Imagine, instead,
the government assigns a policeman and judge to every citizen. A citizen of this country
would have an incredibly robust version of the right to private property. This is a sweater
made of silk laced with gold.
Such a purchase would only be an option for nations with obscene wealth (and
that do not care about diminishing marginal returns). A nation going to the marketplace
of rights must not only consider what rights are available but also what quality of each
right is available. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, India experimented
with both an adversarial system and a mediation system for enforcing the Rule of Law. 24
However, due to the country’s economic restrictions, the nation can only afford to
provide court dates for a small number of citizens, which violates the idea of rights as
equally accessible to all. 25 While mediation might not offer the same quality of Rule of
Law, the system is much more affordable and thus accessible to more of the population. 26
Depending on economic capabilities, some protections for rights might be beyond a
nation’s budget, and the country’s citizens would benefit overall from a more affordable
option. 27

24

Karina T Hwang, “CMC Senior Theses,” CMC Senior Theses (2015),
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1171.
25

Hwang, 44.

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid.
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Why is it important to understand rights as goods? As individuals, our thinking is
primed to make choices about the purchase of goods; we do it practically every day. Is
this sandwich worth it? Do I really need a new shirt? Which movie is better? We are also
primed to consider goods within the context of available resources and tradeoffs. If we
only have fifty dollars in our bank account, we cannot afford a pair of shoes and a shirt.
We must choose.
The language of goods, something that feels natural, can be transferred to the
world of rights, something that may feel unnatural. But it is the intersection of these two
worlds that will allow developing nations to fully maximize their resources. Rights as
goods and nations as purchasers will lay the foundation for a more robust understanding
of the decisions developing nations must make.

22

IV.

Unaffordable Rights
The Human Freedom Index is a measure defined as “the absence of coercive

constraint.” 28 Co-published by the Cato Institute, the Index is notably broad. 29 In this
paper, we will use the Human Freedom Index to understand different nation’s protections
of human rights relative to each other. This Index does not cover exactly what we are
after. For example, part of the Human Freedom Index uses “actual crimes committed” as
a measure of safety. If this number were low because of a very moral population that
does not commit crimes, it would not necessarily mean that nation has more robust rights
protections. 30 Regardless, the Human Freedom Index is a helpful tool for approximating
the degree to which different nations protect human rights.
In 2018, the countries with the five lowest GDPs measured on the Human
Freedom Index were: Seychelles, Gambit, Belize, Central African Republic, and
Bhutan. 31 All five of these nations’ GDPs were less than 0.01% of the GDP of the United

28

“Human Freedom Index,” Cato Institute, March 26, 2020,
https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index-new.
29

“Human Freedom Index,” Cato Institute.

30

Ian Vasquez and Tanja Porcnik, “The Human Freedom Index 2018,” The Human
Freedom Index 2018 (Cato Institute, Fraser Institute, and Friedrich Naumann Foundation
for Freedom, 2018), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/human-freedomindex-2018.pdf.
31

“GDP Ranking,” Data Catalog, accessed June 13, 2020,
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/gdp-ranking; Ian Vasquez and Tanja Porcnik,
“The Human Freedom Index 2019,” ed. Fred McMahon, The Human Freedom Index
2019 (Cato Institute, Fraser Institute, and Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom,
2019), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/human-freedom-index-files/humanfreedom-index-2019.pdf.
23

States. Not a single one of these countries ranked within the top 60 of the 162 measured
nations. 32 Not a single country within the bottom 35% of GDP rankings ranked within the
top 50 of the 2019 Human Freedom Index. 33 This begs the question: why can the poorest
countries not maintain a robust system of protected rights on par with wealthy countries?
As an aside, the reverse of this phenomenon does not exist; wealthy countries do
not necessarily protect rights to the greatest degree. For example, China has the secondhighest GDP, yet is only ranked 126 on the Human Freedom Index. 34 Chapter Five will
discuss the reason for this disparity in greater detail, but the simplest explanation is that
wealth only enables rights; it does not guarantee them. 35
Back to the question at hand: why are poor countries unable to protect rights like
wealthy countries? The bottom 68 lowest-ranked countries by GDP do not even break the
Human Freedom Index’s top 50. 36 This trend is not surprising. Most do not envision
developing nations as leaders in human rights. By examining this trend through the lens
of the framework laid in Chapters One and Two, we can better understand the connection
between GDP and rights.
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Chapter Five further unpacks that greater economic capabilities can only enable a state
to direct funding to a certain end, such as rights. However, many other factors determine
whether or not a state will actually purchase these protections for rights.
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In The Cost of Rights, Holmes and Sunstein paint a bleak picture for citizens not
living in developed nations, “unfortunate individuals who do not live under a government
capable of taxing and delivering an effective remedy have no legal rights.” 37 Eloquently
put, “statelessness spells rightlessness.” 38 Yet, Holmes and Sunstein speak broadly when
discussing a government incapable of taxing. On the one hand, “statelessness” could be
referring to a dysfunctional government, one that simply cannot carry out the necessary
tasks to collect taxes. Whether due to the incompetency of government officials, or some
other reason such as geographic constraints, there is some obstacle in the way of
transferring wealth into the revenue stream. On the other hand, Holmes and Sunstein
could also be referring to a perfectly competent government governing a people too poor
to pay sufficient taxes to support a robust system of rights. So, while yes, “statelessness
spells rightlessness,” in this case, poverty also spells rightlessness. In Chapter Three, we
determined that legal rights must be “bought” in some sense. In this chapter, we confront
the reality that if we must purchase rights, then rights can also be unaffordable.
Imagine that you are the king or queen of a wealthy nation with a population of
one thousand people and a GDP of $100,000. You collect taxes at a flat rate of 10%,
bringing your revenue to $10,000 a year. You decide that you would like to “purchase” a
full set of rights for your citizens. You decide this set includes freedom of speech, the
right to privacy, freedom of religion, the right to private property, and freedom of
movement. After some analysis, you determine how much it will cost you to implement a
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minimal version of each right Freedom of speech will require a court with judges to
prosecute violations, which will cost $1000. The right to privacy will cost you the same
plus the cost of an agency to determine regulations on what information your citizens
should be able to protect, for a total of $1500. Next, you determine freedom of religion
will need the same institutions and thus will cost the same, $1500. The right to private
property will be more expensive, as it will require a police force. You determine
protecting this right will cost $2500. Finally, freedom of movement will be the most
expensive as you will need to create a system of roads, so this right will cost you $3000.
In total, purchasing all of these legal rights for your citizens will run you $9500. Luckily,
this is $500 less than your revenue for the year, so you will be able to purchase all of
these rights, and have a surplus left over for whatever else your nation requires.
That is the easy example. Now, let us move to the harder example, and the one
more relevant to this paper. You are still the king or queen of a nation with one thousand
citizens, but now with a GDP of just $30,000. Your tax rate is still 10%, bringing your
revenue to $3000 a year. You desire to purchase your citizens the same bundle of rights
as the first example, and after some analysis, you determine that they will cost you
exactly the same price to implement. Clearly, you do not have enough revenue to
purchase all of the rights.
What options do you have left? You could just purchase freedom of movement or
property rights, allowing your citizens to live without any protections for the other rights.
You could also afford a bundle of two rights picked from freedom of speech, privacy
rights, and freedom of religion. Either way, there is no feasible way for your citizens to
have the entire bundle of rights.
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When we embrace the concept that all legal rights have budgetary costs,
understanding why the poorest countries cannot create a top-ranked system of human
rights is easy and intuitive. They cannot afford it. To compare the poorest countries to the
wealthiest creates the trap of assuming that they face the same choices. This assumption
is a mistake. When it comes to basic human rights, the wealthiest countries ask: how best
do we protect these rights? The poorest must answer: which rights do we protect, and to
what extent?
How might a developing nation choose among these rights? If all rights have
equal moral value, we could pick between bundles by flipping a coin. This framework
adds a new dimension to choices about protecting rights: monetary costs and benefits.
Before we fully apply this framework, let us first acknowledge another option—
purchasing cheaper, or discount, versions of rights. A discount right is simply the idea
that something is better than nothing. For example, if the main expense for protecting
freedom of movement is building a system of roads, is there another way to protect this
right without this cost? What if, instead, a nation created a mediation system where you
could bring complaints against those who prevent you from moving? Or, as is the case in
certain rural areas of the United States, the state could mandate legal easements, which
allow the public to cross private property to reach a destination. These systems would not
protect freedom of movement like roads might, but they would provide protection where
citizens otherwise would have none. This idea of purchasing discount versions of rights
offers another element of rights. But it also creates new questions: at what point is a right
so discounted that it becomes worthless? Are there certain rights that should never be
bought at discount? The harsh reality is that nations living in extreme poverty face
27

decisions those with abundance may never consider. To make just choices when faced
with such decisions, nations must use every tool at their disposal. In the next chapter, we
will unpack these tools.
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V.

Economic Development as Means
In the previous chapter, we explored how extreme scarcity and limited protections

of rights are intertwined problems for developing nations. Rights have monetary costs,
and these costs present uniquely large obstacles for countries without wealth. For nations
not in this category, there is literature available in ideal theory that provides guidance and
on which rights are basic. For example, Rawls’ first principle of justice asserts a set of
freedoms as a priority. However, these prescriptions do not provide guidance in the shortterm for nations that cannot afford to purchase this set of freedoms.
While the costs are the greatest barrier to entry for these nations, paradoxically,
they are also the greatest source of guidance. If we accept that rights have both monetary
costs and benefits, there is an entirely new dimension by which we can understand rights.
This new dimension allows for two additional means of analysis. First, and most
intuitive, it opens up the opportunity for discount opportunities. Second, monetary costs
and benefits link rights to other rights. By abstracting conversations about a single right
to a broader system, we can access a map that illuminates a path toward achieving a full
set of robust rights.
As discussed in previous chapters, nations have more options at their disposal
beyond either purchasing or not purchasing a right. They can also pursue a discounted
version. Korina Hwang, a student as Claremont McKenna College, argued the merits of
such a path in her senior thesis, “The Procedural Aspect of the Rule of Law: India as a
Case Study for Distinguishing Concept from Conception.” Hwang focused on the Rule of
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Law as a political ideal for both developing and developed countries. 39 Hwang
distinguishes between the procedural ends of Rule of Law, which require a legal system
that—among other things—applies norms and directives effectively and consistently, and
the conception of the Rule of Law, for example, the adversarial court system ingrained in
Western thought. 40 Due to cultural and capacity constraints stemming from economic
limitations, India's adversarial system has proven ineffective and inconsistent at
administering the nation’s laws. 41 In contrast, mediation as an alternative to court
litigation has produced more positive results. 42 Here we find an example of a nation that,
in light of its budgetary limitations, benefits from purchasing a “discount” version of a
right, i.e., mediation over the adversarial system.
We can maintain that, given the resources, the adversarial court system might be
more effective at furthering the moral ends of justice than a mediation system. Yet,
because India cannot afford to implement such a system, attempting to do so actually
undermines the initial ends of Rule of Law. Mediation accomplishes these ends more
effectively while maximizing resources. Eventually, if India experiences enough
economic growth, the nation’s citizens may benefit from a more robust and thorough set
of rights under the adversarial system. But at the moment, Hwang’s research suggests
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that the best use of resources is the less robust but more affordable “discount” version of
Rule of Law, mediation.
Does this mean, given extreme scarcity, cheaper is always better? Not quite.
Hwang’s example illustrates how we can use the monetary costs of rights to make
prudent policy decisions. All rights have costs. But do rights also have monetary
benefits? To understand how we can use monetary benefits as a tool, we must first
recognize that rights are often connected. This is by no means novel. Amartya Sen, in
Development as Freedom, uses this concept as a crucial component of his argument that
development is “an integrated process of expansion of substantive freedoms that connect
with one another.” 43 Sen’s argument extends beyond that of rights, as discussed in this
paper. Instead, Sen focuses on capabilities, as a “kind of freedom,” described informally
as “the freedom to achieve various lifestyles.” 44 To that end, Sen often speaks about legal
rights as “determinants” of freedom, where his focus lies. 45 While the two are not
synonymous, they exist parallel enough that Sen’s work on the interrelatedness of
freedom can serve as a springboard to understanding how rights interrelate.
To that end, Sen creates a distinction between how we might understand different
aspects of human freedom. On the one hand, there is an “intrinsic importance of human
freedom as the preeminent objective of development.” 46 On the other, there is the
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“instrumental effectiveness of freedoms of different kinds to promote human freedom.” 47
This idea is of particular relevance to this paper. Sen provides the example of literacy.
While many would argue that the freedom to read has intrinsic importance, Sen also
highlights the instrumental value of literacy. Illiteracy provides a huge barrier to entry for
economic activities, and thus inhibits economic growth. Furthermore, illiteracy acts as a
barrier to political participation. In this way, literacy not only has intrinsic value but
instrumental value from furthering economic and political freedoms. 48
Certain rights, like freedoms, have instrumental value beyond their inherent value.
To understand this phenomenon, let us focus on a specific case: property rights. In the
realm of legal rights, we can understand property rights as institutionally protected by the
government. As discussed at length, such protections are costly. First, legislators must
make decisions about what constitutes ownership. Second, governments must pay for a
system to adjudicate ownership disputes and violations. Moreover, they will have to pay
for a police force to prevent violence, coercion, or burglary. Costs do not necessarily end
there. For example, what if legislators decide they would like to protect property beyond
that of material goods and include intellectual property. Then, they will need regulatory
bodies to control how and when ideas are protected, such as the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.
Clearly, expanding property rights is a costly affair. Why would a developing
nation dedicate so much of their limited resources to one place? In the spirit of Hwang,
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perhaps we should seek to spend only a minimal amount on protections. But we are
ignoring a crucial component of legal rights: monetary benefits. This is to ask: while we
know that there are going to be costs associate with property rights, are there also
economic benefits the nation will earn back?
As it turns out, the answer is yes. Orguzhan Dincer, a professor at Illinois State
University, set out to quantify the economic benefits nations that invested in the
protection of property rights received. 49 Dincer gathered data from 1982–1997 on global
economic development and property rights protections, using a rule of law index as a
proxy. 50 After adding a set of controls, Dincer modeled how saving rates devoted to
physical or human capital varied based on the level of property rights protections. 51
Dincer found that “per Capita GDP in a country is positively related with the degree of
property rights protection.” 52 Furthermore, by sorting the countries into three
categories—low, medium, and high degrees of property rights protection—Dincer
managed to quantify the monetary return. The model suggests that for countries with a
high degree of protection, a 10% increase in the saving rate devoted to physical capital
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leads to an 11.1% increase in per capita GDP, whereas the same saving rate leads to a
1.7% increase in per capita GDP in countries with a low degree of protection. 53
Why is this 9.4 percentage point boost in GDP per capita so important? For one, it
helps quantify the monetary benefit of these protections. Using a model such as Dincer’s,
a developing nation could predict the return on their investment. But it actually does
something even more groundbreaking. This model does not just measure monetary return
on investments. It highlights a particular instrumental value of property rights. Why? As
this paper has discussed at length, legal rights have costs—costs that restrict developing
nations. An increase in GDP does not just mean a bigger economy or more wealth.
Economic growth can also increase the potential of a developing nation to purchase
additional legal rights. With the right decision-makers in power, a nation could invest that
9.4 percentage point increase into building institutional protections for more rights. If we
factor in the potential economic benefits of particular rights, our framework becomes
more dynamic. Our choice is not: given X resources we can afford to purchase rights Y,
Z, or A. Instead, it is a bit more complex. At this point, given X resources, we can afford
to purchase rights Y, Z, or A. But, if we purchase Y now, it will spur economic growth to
such an extent that in ten years, we can afford all three rights, whereas we can only afford
one now.
As Sen writes extensively, there are many conceivable mechanisms by which
some freedoms gain instrumental value. Through the framework developed in this paper,
the potential of legal rights to spur economic development emerges as one such
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mechanism. Legal rights can absorb the moral value of additional rights purchased by the
economic gains it provides. Consequently, if a developing nation must choose between
rights, the rights that “absorb” the value of others suddenly appear much more attractive.
As discussed, rights may also gain instrumental value in other ways, such as limiting
obstacles to our freedoms and capabilities. For example, perhaps protections for free
speech does not produce the same level of economic growth as property rights, but free
speech may reduce barriers to political participation and self-governance, and
consequently empower citizens to protect other rights that they deem important. While
this benefit may be harder to measure or quantify, that does not make this instrumental
benefit any less valuable.
Economic growth as a mechanism is uniquely relevant for developing nations. For
nations already living under conditions of moderate scarcity, there is less of a direct
connection between increased economic growth and the acquiring of other legal rights.
These nations might not currently protect rights, not due to reasons of budgetary
limitations caused by GDP size, especially concerning the rights we consider basic. In
contrast, the lack of rights protections experienced by developing nations is directly
connected, and in part, caused by their small GDP.
In the previous chapter, we hinted at the limitations of economic growth as a
mechanism for increasing right. Economic growth only enables the purchase of more
rights; it does not mandate the purchase. Remember, back to the example of China.
Despite the nation having the second-highest GDP in the world, it is only ranked 126 on
the Human Freedom Index. Money is a necessary condition for the expansion of legal
rights, but it is not sufficient. Economic growth expands rights when governments use
35

increased revenues to create institutions. This revenue only empowers governments to be
able to purchase these protections. Without decision-makers with the proper incentives,
this increased revenue could never be directed to expand rights. In fact, it could even be
used to restrict them. Therefore, political freedoms that allow citizens to incentivize and
check their governments might be considered preconditions for economic growth to fully
realize its potential.
In the end, this framework offers a balance between two phenomena: 1) economic
growth acting as a precondition for legal rights, and 2) certain legal rights acting as a
precondition for manifesting the potential of economic growth. When it comes to
developing nations, the order in which things are done matters. On the one hand, the
issues raised in this paper present reasons for purchasing rights which spur economic
growth first. Take our example of choosing between expanding protections for property
rights and expanding protections of freedom of speech. If we only have enough revenue
to expand protections for one of these rights, which should we choose? What if
expanding freedom of speech will generate no additional economic growth, but
expanding property rights will generate enough economic growth to expand protections
for freedom of speech? If we expand property rights, in the long run, our end-state will
enable the purchase of both rights. In contrast, if we purchase expansions for freedom of
speech first, then our end-state will never allow for the purchase of both rights without
outside events. But the keyword here is “enable.” Our second phenomenon suggests that
without freedom of speech and other political freedoms, this economic growth might
never be converted to any additional legal rights.
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The real-life decisions faced by developing nations are not quite as simple as
binary choices presented in this paper’s thought experiments. Every nation will have its
own obstacles, history, culture, and other facets that make its policy choices unique.
Consequently, one struggles to imagine a universally applicable sequence of
prioritization for legal rights. More likely, the road “out of the snowstorm” will look less
like a straight line, and more like a winding road—expanding some of a right that
promotes economic growth here and then expanding a political right that will ensure this
growth is used best over there. This balancing act may not lead to quickest economic
growth, but if there is any lesson from the Donner Party, shortcuts often carry great risk.
This is not an argument that developing nations should prioritize economic
growth in the name of increasing legal rights. This is a push to weave the monetary costs
and benefits of legal rights into the policy decision-making process. Rarely do
conversations around rights forget their political components, yet they often forget their
economic components. A cost-aware approach shines light on opportunities for saving,
but monetary benefits of legal rights can provide opportunities for smart long-term policy
decisions. In the end, economic development is a tool—and a powerful one—for
understanding the potential of legal rights. Nevertheless, titular to this chapter, it is the
means, not the end.
In practice, what does this distinction mean? Sen, in an article written in 1993,
titled “Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism
in Promoting Individual Freedoms,” argued against the assumption that economic
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efficiency benefits of competitive markets would translate to freedoms. 54 While Sen
conceded that the competitive market mechanism, absent certain externalities, does have
the capability to promote the “autonomy and immunity from encroachment” aspects of
freedom, issues of inequality also translate to the field of freedom, “and if anything tend
to get magnified.” 55
In this paper, Sen confronted perspectives that tout competitive markets as
effective mechanisms in achieving economic development. Even if this were true, these
arguments only advocate unrestrained competitive markets if economic development is
the ultimate end. If economic development is only a means of achieving a more valued
end—in Sen’s case, expanding capabilities—then the realm of what is justified in pursuit
of economic development becomes considerably smaller.
This chapter references analysis quantifying the monetary benefits of property
rights. Reasonably, the same methodology could be used on any legal right. For example,
intuitively, freedom of movement does not only have intrinsic value, but an individual’s
ability to interact unreservedly with their surroundings most likely has enormous
economic implications. Unfortunately, the same level of research does not exist on other
rights as has been conducted on property rights. If efforts in scholarship were made to
quantify the economic implications of protecting other rights, developing nations would
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have more resources at their disposal to maximize their budget while advancing legal
rights.
Both of these cases in this chapter—Dincer’s research into property rights and
Hwang’s exploration of India’s mediation system—illustrate how prioritizing certain
legal rights might be approached under this paper’s framework. Historically, rights have
often been shielded from their budgetary costs and benefits, as if such discussions might
stain the purity of the moral concept. This resistance harms nations that are most
vulnerable and would most benefit from the protection of legal rights. Countries with
scarce resources do not have the privilege to ignore the real and unavoidable costs of
protecting rights. However, they also could reap the benefits of fully informed decisionmaking. Economic development, properly understood as a powerful tool to further the
ends of legal rights, has the potential to ground policy choices within the reality of the
obstacles facing struggling countries. This is why such discussions must feature the
monetary costs and benefits of rights, not as an afterthought, but at their forefront.
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VI.

Economic Development as a Common Language
Conversations around rights often break down into two camps: those with beliefs

adjacent to social liberalism and those with beliefs adjacent to libertarianism. Those in
the first camp demand a relatively large bundle of political and economic rights and see
government as a facilitator of public good. The second camp holds moral negative rights
as a standard with the expectation that a limited government exists to protect those rights
from infringement. Often, libertarians center their beliefs around protections for private
property. In the world of moderate scarcity, disagreements about the role and extent of
government can create an impenetrable divide on policy.
My hope is that the framework offered in this paper may allow developing nations
to avoid these divides, for two reasons. First, and not unique to this framework, the
earliest stages of development seem to appeal to less disagreement in general. In
conditions of moderate scarcity, disagreements often center around the ends of
government. Social liberal theories lean towards ends of government such as expanding
quality of life or—as Sen would argue—capabilities. In contrast, libertarians demand that
the government protects citizens from infringements on their rights, and then, in a sense,
get out of the way.
In conditions of moderate scarcity, development has advanced enough that we
seem to be surpassing the limits of government as libertarians would see it, yet still
climbing to expand capabilities according to social liberals. For developing nations, their
level of protection of rights is limited to such an extent by their resources. Both social
liberals and libertarians tend to agree that such nations need an expanded government.
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The second reason, and more specific to this framework, is that, even though
these camps disagree on the ends of government, both have reasons for supporting legal
rights that spur economic growth. Social liberals, historically, are more resistant towards
economic development taking the forefront of policy conversations, often leaning
towards more egalitarian justifications. The framework presented in this paper is mostly
aimed at such believers. The previous chapter argues the value of economic development
as a mechanism for enabling the expansion of rights. Social liberals should favor rights
that expand economic development for developing nations, not for economic
development’s own sake, but for its ability to enable them to reach the egalitarian ends
they seek. For example, they have reasons for protecting property rights before other
rights, not because they see economic growth as a valued moral end, but because this
economic growth will enable the government to purchase a larger, more robust system of
protections for all citizens.
In contrast, Nozick-style libertarians’ belief system espouses the protection of
property rights as of central importance. However, even if libertarians’ ideal end-state is a
world with a limited government protecting negative rights, this framework gives them
reasons to support policies in developing nations beyond those rights. Just as is the case
for the social liberal, the protections libertarians hope to purchase will be costly (although
not as costly). They will need a judiciary. Depending on how robust they wish their
protections, they could require an expansive police force. As is the central argument of
Holmes and Sunstein’s The Cost of Rights, these measures will require funding.
More importantly, libertarian claims to private property hinge upon the Lockean
Proviso of leaving all individuals with “enough, and is good.” Many libertarians believe
41

that in conditions of moderate scarcity, this proviso is met. However, most would agree
this proviso is not met in conditions of extreme scarcity. If libertarians wish for citizens
to have claims to private property, they must first enact measures that further economic
growth. To this end, libertarians have reasons to support a wide range of policies they
might otherwise resist. In developing nations, a libertarian could conceivably support
programs like mandatory vaccinations or intellectual property protections if they could be
tied to economic growth.
By highlighting the value of the monetary costs and benefits of rights, this
framework allows for more space for agreement on where developing nations should
spend resources. Agreement, in the developing world, is arguably a more important asset
than in the developed world. While the stagnation of government in countries like the
United States due to polarization undoubtedly brings severe consequences, these
consequences do not compare to those suffered in countries without self-sustaining
institutions.
This is not an argument that developing nations should subscribe to a tunnel
vision approach centered upon economic growth. Nor is this even an argument that
economic growth has more value than other justifications for purchasing certain legal
rights. This is a reminder—a reminder of the importance of the economic realities.
Countries in extreme scarcity do not have the luxury of considering costs as an
afterthought. Attempting to apply an ideal theory of what set of rights should be protected
for countries in moderate scarcity to developing nations is not only impractical but
ignores the central question facing developing nations: what rights can we afford?
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Without acknowledging that all legal rights have costs, it is impossible to have any
conversations of worth for nations that cannot afford to ignore these costs.
Furthermore, if one acknowledges costs, they should acknowledge that some
rights also have monetary benefits. Without doing so, policymakers are vulnerable to
making mistakes about the true impact of allocating resources towards specific
protections. Whether connected through the mechanism of economic growth or another
mechanism, rights can have instrumental value that is crucial for understanding how a
developing nation can one day achieve a full bundle of rights.
Finally, with these costs and benefits in mind, both sequencing and discounting
become essential pillars of wise policymaking for countries in extreme scarcity.
Sequencing, because the order in which resources are allocated to legal rights will impact
the speed that the expansion of rights will become available. Discounting, because for
countries without resources to spare, resources spent should be maximized. Furthermore,
recognizing legal rights as subject to degrees of protection opens the door, justifying
stripped-down legal rights that might otherwise be considered unacceptable in more
developed nations.
Somehow, along the way, conversations surrounding rights were siphoned into
realms implicitly acknowledged as “non-economic areas.” But to discuss rights without
economics is a privilege afforded to those not facing extreme economic pressure. For
developing nations, there are no non-economic areas. To pretend otherwise is to not only
counterproductively divert discussions, but to hold these nations to unjust and unfair
standards.
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